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Abstract 
The MH-60S helicopter program is currently in the development stages of 
incorporating provisions for the Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) Mission and 
the Armed Helicopter Mission. The integration of these mission provisions represents a 
departure from the initial design goals of the MH-60S as solely a combat support 
helicopter. This aircraft will ultimately be expected to execute in excess of 18 different 
missions in place of seven existing aircraft rather than just serving as a replacement for 
the H-46 helicopter. 
Common to any aircraft program is the issue of weight growth. Weight growth 
has been cited as a major risk on this program in light of the fact that there will be 
provisions for both major mission areas in the final (FY 07) aircraft configuration. As a 
result of not anticipating specific design impacts associated with the requirement to 
perform a wide range of missions, the aircraft will not meet the requirements set forth in 
the Operational Requirements Document. The fact that a single aircraft will be taking the 
place of several aircraft that were implicitly designed for specific missions serves to 
further increase the gap between the requirements and the realized, as-designed 
performance. 
The specific weight issue can be further clarified by a discussion of weight 
growth over time and a study of how each mission area will add weight. Incident to this 
discussion is a comparison of aircraft performance versus the requirements and the 
associated shortfalls in range, time on station, and combat radius. There are many areas 
where weight can be shed. Weight reduction and performance enhancements have 
iv 
become unfunded program requirements, resulting in detailed analysis and considerations 
for postproduction changes to the aircraft. In this thesis, background and causal factors 
for the weight/performance issue will be analyzed. Candidates for weight reduction and 
performance enhancements that yield the greatest performance increase will be proposed. 
V 
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The analyses, opinions, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author 
and do not represent the official position of the Naval Air Systems Command or the 
Department of the Navy. Data presented in this thesis were obtained from various 
program office analyses and briefings in support of the MH-60S program. The 
integration of the Airborne Mine Countermeasures and Armed Helicopter missions into 
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Following the Gulf War, the Armed Forces experienced a period of major 
downsizing. This downsizing was applicable to all areas and included but was not 
limited to manpower and equipment. Naval war fighting doctrine including From the Sea 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2010/2020 operational concepts are the 
documents which describe the reshaping and restructuring of the Naval Forces for the 2 1st 
century. 
A common thread throughout the doctrine is an increased emphasis on realigning 
force structure to be able to support sustained, conventional threats as well as addresses 
the unconventional/asymmetric threats that were highlighted September 1 1, 2001. The 
Naval Forces of the future must be able to fight in the littorals while maintaining the 
capability to conduct traditional 'blue-water' operations by leveraging and 
complementing the capabilities of other armed services. Ultimately, the collective 
doctrine describes a large degree of flexibility to the war fighter while highlighting the 
need to be a leader in technology. 
A product of Naval Force restructuring is the CNO-approved Helicopter Master 
Plan (HMP) of 1998. The HMP was initiated in FY 1996 and represented the plan for 
helicopter aviation in response to the H-2 helicopter reaching the end of its service life. 
Ultimately, the HMP drives a reduction from seven type/model/series helicopters 
currently in use by the Navy to two; the MH-60S and the MH-60R. 
The most obvious reason for this major change to force structure is to reduce 
acquisition as well as operations and support costs while supporting the concepts 
embodied in Joint Vision 2010/2020. The HMP acquisition strategy calls for a one for 
one airframe replacement with either an MH-60S or an MH-60R. It is interesting to note 
that the HMP is not based on war fighting analysis but only on life cycle cost reduction. 
The HMP calls for retirement of the H-3, H-2, H-46D, H-60F, H-60B, H-1 and 
the H-60H. The MH-60S will take the role of the H-46 in its VERTREP role and the H-3 
and H-1 in its utility role. H-60F and HH-60H aircraft will be retired as the MH-60S 
assumes their missions in the CVBG. The MH-60R will assume the H-60B and the H-2 
missions. Figure 1 illustrates the migration of missions to an all H-60 helicopter 
community. 
( ) • CURRENT INVENTORY 
I"' # •REQUIREMENT (PAA) 
SH-60F 70 (75) 
SH-60B 179 (168) 
MH-60R 
SH-2G 10 (10) ...J 243 
CH-46O 93 (70) •I 
H-3 67 (56) vi ? MH-605 
HH-1N 27 (21) 
HH-60H 52 (38) 
237 
MH-53E 45 (43) 
FY00 FY04 FY0S FY12 
TOTAL: 543 (481) 480 
FIGURE 1: GRAPHICAL DEPICTION OF HELICOPTER MASTER PLAN 
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The MH-53E currently employed by the Navy for Airborne Mine 
Countermeasures (AMCM) and Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD) begins to reach the 
end of its service life limit in FY 07. While the MH-53E was not specifically called out 
in the HMP, unofficial references to the future of the MH-53E tentatively trace its 
mission being transferred to the MH-60S. Furthermore, recent cost benefit analyses seem 
to favor eventual replacement of the MH-53E aircraft with the MH-60S. It is anticipated 
that a decision on whether to perform a service life extension program or retire the MH-
53E will need to be addressed not later than the POM 06 process (fiscal year (FY) 2004). 
The HMP transition to an all H-60 helicopter fleet is not a drastic change in 
capability except in the case of the MH-53E. In other words, the relative lift capabilities 
of all seven helicopters are fairly close to an H-60. Although the author will explore this 
area further, the transition from the MH-53E to an MH-60S possesses unique challenges 
in the AMCM and heavy lift missions. 
Concept of Operations 
Related to the HMP is the development of the helicopter concept of operations or 
CONOPS. Given an all H-60 helicopter fleet, the Navy must decide on a force structure 
that will provide the greatest war fighting capability. CONOPS is chartered to provide 
the correct numbers of helicopters combined with a streamlined command and control 
structure. The goal of CON OPS is completion of infrastructure realignment and the first 
MH-60R/S carrier deployment in FY 2008. 
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Based on the introduction of the MH-60S and MH-60R, combined with the 
retirement of the S-3, helicopter CONOPS has become a major driver in the realignment 
of the battle group. The overall purpose, of course, is victory in combat. This will occur 
by assigning the right number of helicopters to perform increased Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), and AMCM coverage. The battle group 
(BG) commander will gain ultimate benefits as his situational awareness is improved and 
force protection is increased. The obvious difference from current force structure is that 
these benefits will be realized through the use of multi-mission capable, battle group­
linked, H-60 helicopters. 
Specifically, helicopter CONOPS brings four areas of force multiplication to the 
BG commander: 
1. Mitigation of the ASuW coverage gap as a result of the S-3 retirement. The 
MH-60R and the MH-60S will operate synergistically in a sensor and shooter 
role respectively. Most importantly there will be three times the number of 
armed helicopters in the battle group that will provide a 24-hour coverage 
capability. 
2. Provides the required ASW coverage to meet the littoral threat. CONOPS 
will also provide three times the number of dipping sonars available to the BG 
commander as well. 
3. Substantial Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Maritime Interdiction 
Operations {MIO), Naval Special Warfare (NSW) capability resident in the 
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battle group. Five-fold increase in the number of assets available to conduct 
these types of missions. 
4. Provides an organic AMCM capability to the BG commander. Currently, the 
only AMCM asset in the Navy is the MH-53E. The MH-53E, because of its 
size and the large logistics trail associated with current mine warfare sensors, 
is not deployed as part of the battle group. MH-53E assets are known as 
dedicated AMCM assets and can operate from either L-class ships or be land­
based. These assets are known as dedicated AMCM assets because they are 
employed in a "911-response" nature. When the mine warfare risk increases 
either through intelligence or actual mining operations, AMCM operations are 
initiated. The fact that the AMCM assets are not resident in the BG can have 
serious implications as to where the BG can and cannot transit. Providing an 
organic AMCM capability to the BG commander through the MH-60S greatly 
increases his flexibility and ability to react quickly without having to rely 
upon a protracted MH-53E response time. 
The previous discussion of CON OPS dealt with the benefits gained by the BG 
commander as a result of increased helicopter numbers resident on the carrier and the 
MH-60S taking on many missions. CONOPS also calls for replacement of the 
expeditionary structure. The two CH-46D helicopters currently deployed with the ARG 
for amphibious SAR will be replaced by up to four MH-60Ss. The same number of MH-
60Rs will similarly replace the one or two SH-60B aircraft per ship deployed throughout 
the battle group in independent surface action groups. Capability for other missions 
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including AMCM, heavy lift, Search and Rescue (SAR), Carrier Qualification (CQ) 
detachments, and Very Important Personnel (VIP) airlift will be maintained from shore 
based MH-60Ss and possibly MH-53Es. Although the MH-60R is a major part of the 
HMP and CONOPS, the author will focus primarily on the MH-60S in this thesis. 
From a war fighting and certainly a fiscal standpoint, the transition to two 
helicopters that carry out all missions is a valid argument. The MH-60S must ultimately 
be able to carry out 18 different types of missions. Although the inherent nature of a 
helicopter is versatility, it follows that the degree of mission-specific optimization 
ultimately drives performance in a specific mission area. A derived requirement ' of 
CONOPS and the HMP then is to develop the MH-60S in order to limit the degree of 
specific mission sub optimization. In other words, the MH-60S will have to do all of its 
missions well and cannot be designed for any one specific mission. 
Operational Requirements 
Leading up to the initial operating capability date (IOC) of the MH-60S (August 
2000) the current HC helicopter, the H-46D, had been in service for 25 years and has 
exceeded its service life. The mission needs statement which drove the operational 
requirements document cited the urgency of replacing the HC helicopter. 
The primary mission of the HC helicopter is to provide rapid airborne delivery of 
personnel and material to Naval forces engaged in power projection. The secondary 
1 
Derived requirements are requirements that are not specifically listed, but become necessary in 
order for the aircraft to successfully perform its anticipated mission(s). 
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mission is to provide support to the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) by providing a 
SAR capability. These two missions historically comprised the main capabilities of an 
HC helicopter. In line with the HMP, however, the Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD) also mandated that the replacement HC helicopter would also be required to 
support the armed helicopter (AH) mission and the airborne mine countermeasures 
mission. In fact, the ORD is written in such a manner that the HC replacement helicopter 
is the base mission and that the AH and AMCM missions are additive to the base 
mission. 
The typical operational requirements document outlines the requirements that the 
acquisition community must utilize in their procurement. Through the systems 
engineering process, the specification of the chosen product is trace-linked back to the 
ORD. In this manner, the acquisition community is guaranteed that the aircraft that is 
being procured meets the requirements of the war fighter. In the case of the multi-mission 
combat support ORD, the MH-60S is actually identified as the replacement. This 
represented a deviation from the majority of ORDs in that the aircraft to be procured was 
mandated. Paragraph 1.3 of the multi-mission combat support helicopter ORD refers to 
the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) that was performed to analyze what aircraft would be 
best suited for this role. 
The AOA supports the procurement of a MH-60S (a modified in-production 
helicopter, which provides maximum commonality with the US Navy H-60s and 
US Army UH-60Ls currently in service and fully supported by the DOD logistics 
system) as the most cost effective approach to meeting mission requirements for 
the Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) and Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD) 
for Combat Logistics Force (CLF) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships 
and maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) support for L-class amphibious ships. 
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For clarity, it should be stressed that the MH-60S was categorized as a new production 
aircraft. 
The major reason that· the MH-60S was approved was the large amount of 
commonality it shared with the existing H-60 airframe and the resultant reduction in life 
cycle costs. Although not specifically stated, it is obvious that the HMP was a major 
driver of this solution. Furthermore, since the MH-60S would be based on a marinized 
version of the existing, in production UH-60 Black Hawk, it was intended to be a quick 
solution for an HC replacement aircraft. 
Industry and the acquisition community certainly felt the pressure leading up to 
the IOC of the MH-60S in Aug 2002. The Class A mishap rate of the aging H-46 had 
increased drastically as a result of a rapid rise in the engine failure frequency rate. The 
urgency of the requirement most likely resulted in the fact that the basic MH-60S 
program turned out to be very successful as it was below cost and ahead of schedule. It 
must be kept in mind that the basic program and almost the majority of the effort, both 
technically and fiscally, was to field a replacement for the HC mission. Although the 
ORD clearly mandated the follow-on AH and AMCM mission integration, these missions 
were not the top priority for fielding a replacement for the H-46 helicopter. 
Annexes A and B to the ORD delineated the requirements for Armed Helicopter 
and Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures respectively. It was mentioned earlier in 
this section that the typical ORD does not identify the system or aircraft to be procured. 
The multi-mission combat support helicopter ORD not only mandated the aircraft to be 
procured but also went on to identify the type of acquisition strategy to follow. The 
8 
Block I aircraft would be the VERTREP aircraft, Block II would incorporate AMCM 
modifications, and Block III would incorporate armed helicopter provisions. The blocks 
would be added under the premise of an evolutionary acquisition strategy where 
increasing capability is fielded to the Fleet over the course of time. 
The H-60 airframe was proven in the fleet and in the Army that it could 
successfully be employed for a majority of missions. The MH-60S, although described 
as a new aircraft, was still based on H-60 legacy design. Although multi-mission was 
planned as future growth to the MH-60S, the H-60 airframe remained the 'box' to design 
around. New missions, when added, would be based on reverse engineering. It is not 
surprising that the additive nature of the armed helicopter and AMCM missions have 
posed the greatest challenge to the program from a technical standpoint. 
Statement of the Problem 
The basis for design of the MH-60S was for utility missions (cargo and 
passengers) and assumption of the role of the aging H-46 helicopter. As the Navy's HMP 
and CON OPS evolved, the planned role of the MH-60S transitioned from an H-46 
replacement helicopter to an aircraft that would be expected to. execute in excess of 18 
different missions. To compound the problem, the MH-60S would assume the mission 
capabilities of helicopters that were designed based on a specific mission. The 
implications to helicopter design as a result of the multi-mission requirement should have 
been considered in the early stages of the program. Ideally, this should be accomplished 
prior to production. 
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In the case of the MH-60S, the program was ultimately faced with 
the task of integrating additional mission capability into an existing helicopter design 
where aircraft performance was fixed. As a result of the planned aircraft provisions 
combined with a wide range of operational requirements, the as designed MH-60S 
performance capability quickly became inadequate. Design requirements for a multi­
mission helicopter not addressed pre-design ultimately lead to the identification of 
unfunded, unplanned weight reduction and performance enhancement programs. 
I O  
History 
II. Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures 
Even prior to the Civil War, the use of sea mines had been identified as an 
effective form of naval warfare. Although, initially classified as an "unethical" form of 
naval warfare, the use of sea mines as a tactic became large-scale during the American 
Civil War. Throughout the course of history many lessons were learned as to the utility 
of mine warfare. The most vivid statement was made during the Korean War by the 
Admiral Sherman with regard to the importance of mine warfare: "When you can't  go 
where you want to go, when you want to, you haven't got command of the sea. And 
command of the sea is a rock-bottom foundation for all of our war plan .. .  " (U.S. Navy 
Mine Familiarizer, 1999). As technology developed so did the type and numbers of 
mines as evidenced by their use in Vietnam and the Gulf War. 
The sea mine remains a cost effective, offensive and defensive weapon within any 
country's naval arsenal. The most evident use of mines was during the Gulf War where 
two ships, the USS Princeton (CG-59) and the USS Tripoli (L�H- 10), both struck Iraqi 
sea mines in the Persian Gulf. The mines that had probably cost on the order of several 
thousand dollars caused damages far exceeding 20 million dollars to the two warships. 
This graphic example from our recent history displays the utility of sea mines especially 
to nations that have small navies. More important is the fact that our allies and 
adversaries alike realize that the sea mine is a relatively inexpensive weapon that works 
remarkably well in leveling the playing field between two unequal opponents. 
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The very threat of the presence of mines in the water will delay or deter the 
movement of naval forces until the threat can be validated or neutralized. In future 
conflicts, it is not unreasonable to surmise that mines pre-positioned either overtly or in a 
clandestine fashion could limit our battle space dominance. It follows that the Navy is 
committed to maintaining a viable mine warfare posture. 
AMCM Defined 
Currently, the primary mission of the AMCM force is to maintain the capability to 
rapidly deploy worldwide to conduct independent or integrated MCM operations. This is 
the current mission of the two HM squadrons that currently employ the MH-53E. The 
task of locating and, if necessary, neutralizing sea mines must be executed as quickly as 
possible in order to maintain battle group maneuverability. This must be accomplished 
through all available MCM assets resident in the CVBG or ARG and augmented, as 
necessary, by assets that are CO NUS-based. 
To adequately define the future requirements for AMCM, the CNO staff is 
writing a Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) for Mine Countermeasures. The 
CRD will provide broad requirements in all mine warfare scenarios including a mine 
clearance timeline in strategic chokepoints and Sea Line of Communication to support 
war fighting requirements. In order to meet the requirements, the CRD cites a family of 
MCM systems that will combat the threat. The family of systems includes minehunting 
sensors, minesweeping systems, and mine neutralization systems. These systems are 
12 
planned to be primarily deployed from the forthcoming AMCM helicopter platform, the 
MH-608. 
Mine warfare doctrine can be divided into two broad categories: mine hunting 
and mine sweeping. The preferred method of locating and neutralizing sea mines is 
through mine hunting which is conducted using sonar systems towed from the helicopter 
or a pod mounted external to the helicopter. This method is preferred due to the ability to 
rapidly respond to a threat combined with the fact that many complicated fuzing 
mechanisms that include such features as ship counters and dormant periods. The mine 
hunting systems provide for detection of both bottom mine as well as mines moored in 
the water volume. These mine hunting systems are complemented by mine neutralization 
systems that are mounted on the helicopter to neutralize the previously located mine. 
In geographic areas where mine hunting is not practical, areas that possess poor 
bottom characteristics, or where there is a large amount of clutter, mine hunting is not 
practical. Influence minesweeping involves towing an influence system behind the 
helicopter to cause mines to safely detonate. The influence system generates magnetic 
and acoustic signatures similar to the target ship. 
Organic AMCM vs. Dedicated AMCM 
· The current approach to AMCM is through the use of dedicated MH-53E 
helicopters. The purpose of dedicated assets, now and in the future, is to provide an 
increased AMCM capability necessary to sustain long-term mine clearance operations or 
short-term intensive operations. 
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Future requirements, however, point to the use of organic assets. Organic assets 
are those assets that are resident in the CVBG or ARG vice assets that must be sent to the 
area of operations. The AMCM missions will be fulfilled through the use of MH-60S 
helicopters that are outfitted with removable AMCM mission kits, sensors, and weapons. 
The BG commander will possess the equipment to quickly identify, detect, neutralize, 
and avoid bottom, submerged and floating sea mines. A notional timeline of an organic 
employment of the MH-60S helicopter in a typical mine warfare scenario is provided 
below: 
I .  Battle group commander determines threat level. 
2. Exploratory/Reconnaissance: Mine hunting sensors deployed from the MH-
60S to determine presence/absence of mines. 
3. Results of exploratory reconnaissance evaluated to determine whether BG 
can transit through or avoid suspected area. 
4. If adequate operational maneuver area is not available to BG commander, 
mine clearance operations commence using AMCM MH-60S to deploy 
neutralization or influence sweep systems. 
The notional timeline provided above would be similar to a dedicated mission with 
the exception that the MH-60S will actually be embarked on the aircraft carrier CV(N). 
Dedicated AMCM would still exist and would be available to augment the organic forces 
in the case of a major regional conflict. Ultimately, organic AMCM provides flexibility 
to the BG commander and most importantly decreases the mine countermeasures (MCM) 
time line. 
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Annex B to the multi-mission combat support helicopter ORD states that the MH-
60S " . .. shall employ permanently installed aircraft equipment fixtures and removable 
(roll-on/roll-off) AMCM mission configuration equipment kits that allow integration, . 
deployment, and operation of the individual AMCM sensor or weapon on/from the 
helicopter." The ORD also states that aside from providing the CVBG and the ARG with 
an organic capability, it may also serve to replace the current Navy's force structure of 
MH-53Es. As such the MH-60S will also become the dedicated AMCM platform. In 
order to understand the intricacies involved with the MH-60S assuming the AMCM role 
it is beneficial to briefly examine the differences between the two aircraft with respect to 
size and performance as well as a brief look at the current AMCM mission. 
Aircraft Description ofMH-53E 
The MH-53E is a three-engine helicopter produced by Sikorsky Aircraft. It has a 
maximum gross weight of 69,750 pounds and is capable of sustained towing operations 
of 25,000 pounds with surges up to 30,000 pounds. 
There is a common misconception throughout the U.S. Navy that concept of 
operations for dedicated mine warfare is solely through the use of a 'sled' that is towed 
behind the MH-53E. Although the mission is deemed critical when threat levels increase, 
the mission is not widely understood. The AMCM mission practiced in the Navy of 
today includes a large amount of mission planning and post mission analysis based on the 
tactical employment of a variety of sensors. The MH-53E commonly employs the 
following systems in order to conduct the dedicated mission: 
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1. MK-103 - A moored minesweeping system that is used to sever mines from 
their moorings. The MK-103 contains mechanical sweep wires that contain 
explosive mechanical cutters as well as fixed non-explosive cutters. The 
sweep is towed behind the MH-53E utilizing tensions ofup to 1 1,000 pounds 
and sweep lengths up to 2150 feet. 
2. AN/AQS-24 - A  side-looking sonar that is towed behind the MH-53E. The 
system is comprised of an actively controlled, towed underwater vehicle, an 
electromechanical tow cable and winch, and associated controls and monitors. 
The side-looking, multi-beam forming sonar provides the operator with the 
ability to search for bottom targets as well as targets which are in the water 
volume. 
3. MK-105 - The MK-105 commonly known as 'the sled' is used to sweep 
against influence mines. The system includes a platform that is stabilized via 
hydrofoils when under tow behind the MH-53E. The MK-105 has the 
capability of providing 2000 amps that is used to produce a magnetic 
signature that mimics a ship. It should be noted that there are several ways in 
which to launch the MK-105 from the well deck of an L-class ship to a beach 
launch. All methods require a fair amount of manpower outside of the 
helicopter crew as well as three small boats for stabilizing and tending the 
MK-105 components during launch and recovery. 
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4. MK-104 .:... This system is used to sweep acoustic mines. As the MK- 104 is 
towed through the water a cavitating venturi system utilizes the seawater to 
generate noise that would mimic the acoustic signature of a ship. 
5 .  MK-106 � The MK-106 is  essentially a MK-105 with a MK-1 04 attached to 
it. This system is used to sweep acoustic and influence mines. 
6. · AN/SPU-IW - This system is also known as the magnetic orange pipe or 
MOP. Although initially designed and employed to sweep against influence 
mines, the MOP is most commonly used for training. 
Although a discu�sion of current AMCM tactics is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
current tactics revolve around the use of the AQS-24 for initial exploratory 
reconnaissance of an area that is suspected to have been mined or is essential for 
movement of the fleet. Once the threat is identified through reconnaissance it is either 
swept or avoided. As discussed previously, there are _areas that cannot be effectively 
evaluated using the underwater sonar which drives the requirement for sweeping or 
avoidance �f the area. Where the area cannot be avoided, sweeping is essential. 
Aircraft Description of MH-60S 
In stark comparison to the MH-53E, the MH-60S is a twin-engine helicopter also 
produced by Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. It has a maximum gross weight of 23,500 
pounds. Once modified the aircraft will have provisions for externally mounting AMCM 
systems as well as towing up to tensions _of 6000 pounds. 
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Organic AMCM (OAMCM) Systems 
PMS-210, the AMCM program office, owns the acquisition programs for the next 
generation AMCM systems that are intended to replace or augment the systems 
previously mentioned. A notional diagram of the employment of OAMCM systems is 
included in Figure B-12 and a brief description of the organic AMCM systems follow: 
1. AN/ AQS-20A - The Q-20A is essentially a follow on system to the legacy Q-
24. In addition to multi-mode sonar, the Q20A will have an electro optic 
identification (EOID) feature that will provide for identification of mines in 
the water volume. In aggregate, the system will have forward looking sonar 
to avoid mines, side scan sonar to detect mines on the bottom and volume 
search sonar to detect volume mines. The Q-20 will be towed behind the MH-
60S. 
2. AN/AES- I - The AES- I or Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMOS) 
will use Light Detection and Ranging technology (LIOAR) to detect, localize, 
and classify near-surface moored and floating sea mines. The ALMOS will 
provide organic self-protection, mine avoidance, and precursory 
reconnaissance in the combat escort role. The ALMOS is a 'pod' based 
system and will be employed by the MH-60S in a free flight (non-towed) 
regime at groundspeeds up to 80 knots. 
3 .  Airborne Mine Neutralization System - The AMNS will be employed by the 
MH-60S to explosively neutralize unburied bottom and moored sea mines. 
This system is also non-towed. 
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4. AN/ ALQ-220 - The Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep System 
(OASIS) will provide an organic, high�speed, magnetic/acoustic influence 
minesweeping capability to be employed by the MH-60S or selected surface 
craft in support of the CVBG. An open-loop electrode design will provide the 
requisite influence output in a self-contained, transportable unit weighing less 
· than 1000 pounds. OASIS is essentially a replacement for the MK-106 that 
will be towed from the MH-60S when influence/acoustic minesweeping is 
deemed necessary. 
5. Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System - RAMICS will be comprised of an 
integrated targeting, fire control, gun system, and supercavitating projectile 
technologies as a reacquisition and prosecution capability against near surface 
moored and floating mines. RAMICS will also be a non-towed system. 
From the brief description of the systems above it is apparent that there is no one­
for-one replacement of current system with next generation systems. In fact, the organic · 
systems represent the elimination in the capability to perform mechanical minesweeping. 
The fact remains, however, that the Navy is determined to have an organic AMCM 
capability that utilizes an MH-60S. Furthermore, if these systems prove to be effective, 
the Navy is on track to retire the MH-53E forwarding the complete AMCM role to the 
MH-60S. 
· The Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, continues to pledge support of the 
MCM forces. In a recent letter delivered to mine warfare proponents, Secretary England 
assures that he is committed to funding a potent mine warfare force while launching the 
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organic force in 2005 (Inside the Navy, November 2002). This is consistent with the fact 
that in the DPG of FY 2002, the Navy was directed to achieve organic mine 
countermeasures capability in at least one CVBG by FY 05. In other words, not only is 
the Navy committed to this effort it is also 'under the gun' to deliver this capability by 
FY 2005. 
The Navy has chosen this path for the future based on financial reasons despite 
limited war fighting analyses. Although the subject of continued as well as future 
analysis, it is postulated that the organic capability will be an acceptable replacement for 
the current capability and will bridge the loss of the MH-53E. 
2Figures B- 1 through B-5 are included in Appendix B. 
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III. Armed Helicopter 
Current Concept of Operations 
Currently, the HS and the HCS communities employ the HH-60H in a variety of 
armed roles. The group of armed missions is covered under the broad term known as 
CSAR. Currently, the HS community employs carrier based HH-60H helicopters to 
perform the CSAR mission in addition to organic anti-surface warfare, Force Protection 
(FP), and expanded Special Warfare Support (SWS) capabilities. In the reserve 
component, HCS squadrons perform the same role with emphasis on CSAR also using 
the HH-60H. 
As the current world situation has developed over the past several years, the use 
of armed helicopters for force protection as well as rescue of downed aviators in hostile 
regions has become vital. The situation has also driven an increased role of the Navy in 
special warfare missions both at sea and over land. The insertion and extraction of 
SEALs is a perfect example of the increased usage of naval H-60s. 
Armed Helicopter 
The MH-60S, or armed multi-mission helicopter, will assume the role of the 
current HH-60Hs in its armed configuration. The armed role, although equally as 
complex as the AMCM mission, is more easily understood and is well known throughout 
the fleet. Further, unlike in the AMCM mission, arming the MH-60S does not change the 
nature of the mission as it is performed today. For these reasons, a protracted discussion 
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of the armed helicopter mission will not be made. Simply stated, the MH-60S will be 
modified so that it can also carry out the mission that is performed by the HH-60H of 
today. Annex A of the ORD states "The MH-60S shall be capable of accomplishing the 
CSAR, expanded SWS and SUW missions through the installation of mission kits 
containing CSAR/SWS/SUW peculiar equipment." Just as in the case the AMCM 
capability, the ORD mandates that the armed helicopter mission be additive to the base 
combat helicopter support mission. " . . . The system characteristics listed herein are 
additive to those delineated in the base Multi-mission Combat Support Helicopter ORD." 
(ORD, 2002) 
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IV. MH-60S Acquisition Strategy 
Base Aircraft 
As discussed previously, the baseline aircraft was a VERTREP replacement 
aircraft. In order to save money and time, the Navy essentially procured a marinized 
version of the Anny UH-60 Black Hawk. Although the UH-60 was in production, the 
MH-60S differed enough from the UH-60 that it was handled as a new production aircraft 
with its own production line and contracting strategy. 
The MH-60S contained the baseline Black Hawk configuration with Naval Hawk 
(SH-60) engines, rotor systems and dynamic components. It also included the Sea Hawk 
automatic rotor blade folding system, folding tail pylon, rotor brake, and automatic flight 
computer. Figure B-2 shows the relative make up of the MH-60S with respect to Black 
Hawk baseline, Sea Hawk baseline, and new development components. 
From figure B-2 is apparent that the MH-60S is essentially a marinized version of the 
Black Hawk. The MH-60S production line at Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation is actually 
the same line as the Black Hawk line. The line splits at the point where Sea Hawk 
common components are installed. At the end of the production line, the MH-60S is 
completely built with the exception of the cockpit. 
Common Cockpit/ Avionics 
In the increasing attempt to maximize commonality between the MH-60S and the 
MH-60R, a common cockpit was dev�loped and procured from Lockheed Martin. The 
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common cockpit consists of two flat panel displays per pilot; one for mission information 
and one for flight information. Each pilot also has a workstation that includes keysets 
and access to pointing devices. The common cockpit also includes communication and 
navigation subsystems, flight instruments, and manual operator input/output panels. 
Backup flight instruments are provided in the center of the instrument console and 
include airspeed, attitude, stabilator position, and clock. The cockpit is software driven 
through the Avionics Operating Program (AOP) which is hosted on 2 flight management 
computers. 
Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy 
The ORD clearly defined that future missions would be additive to the basic 
combat support helicopter. In other words, the basic combat support helicopter would be 
procured and future mission capability would be added. This is in contrast to developing 
a helicopter that can complete all of its intended missions from the time it is delivered. 
The sole purpose in a strategy such as this is to field an initial capability rapidly and 
provide follow on capability when it becomes available. The basic combat support 
helicopter would be fielded to answer an emergent requirement and AMCM and Armed 
Helicopter would be fielded at a later date. 
The acquisition strategy for the MH-60S calls for the procurement of a total of 
237 aircraft. All 237 aircraft will be capable of performing the basic VERTREP mission. 
Capability to perform AMCM and armed helicopter missions will be forward fit only. In 
other words, the capability will be introduced into the production line when it is 
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available. It will not be retrofitted. This concept as well as the evolutionary acquisition 
plan is displayed graphically in figure B-3. 
Block I aircraft are the VERTREP aircraft. Blocks II and III will be AMCM and 
armed helicopter respectively. From a production line standpoint, the AMCM 
modifications will be cut in the production line starting with aircraft 51 and the armed 
helicopter modifications will begin with aircraft 85. Aircraft 1 through 50 will not be 
AMCM capable and similarly aircraft 1 through 85 will not be armed helicopter capable. 
However, aircraft 85 and subsequent will have the provisions for all missions. 
Figure B-4 is a graphical depiction of the MH-60S program. Block IIA will 
include initial AMCM capability to include Q-20A and ALMOS and is planned for IOC 
in calendar year 05 . Block 11B will bring the remainder of AMCM capability and will 
include RAMICS, OASIS, and AMNS in FY 2007. Block IIA is sometimes referred to 
as the '05 configuration' and Block 11B is referred to as the 'final configuration' .  
Block IIIA will provide an initial armed helicopter capability to the fleet in FY06. 
The remainder of this capability will be fielded in Block IIIB in FY07 with yet future 
growth in this mission area beyond FY 2007. 
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V. Mission Profiles 
Definition 
Included in the ORD are descriptions of the various types of missions that the 
combat support helicopter must be able to accomplish. The ORD is written in such a 
manner as to provide latitude with respect to the degree of meeting all of the 
requirements. The threshold requirement is the minimum acceptable capability. The 
objective requirement is the goal. Each mission area contains both threshold and 
objective values. The ORD complete with Annexes A and B calls for a sum total of 20 
missions. 
In each section of the ORD, mission profiles are described using a scenario. 
Unfortunately, the scenarios are open to interpretation with respect to aircraft 
configuration. The base ORD missions are: VERTREP, VOD, Amphibious SAR, 
Airhead Operations, NEO, SAR, SWS (OL). Verbatim descriptions of each mission 
scenario from the ORD, proceeded by the author's interpretation where applicable, 
- follow in the paragraphs below: 
Base ORD Missions: 
VERTREP 
ORD Definition: 
Ship-to-Ship, 500-1000 yds separation. Vertical takeoff to Hover Out of Ground Effect 
(HOGE) for 15 seconds. Pick-up a maximum external payload of 5500 lb. (3000 lb. 
average), transition to forward flight and climb to 150 ft AGL. Transit 500-1000 yds. 
Descend to ship edge height, HOGE for 15 seconds and release payload. 
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Ship-to-Ship, Connected Replenishment (CONREP) Position. Vertical takeoff to HOGE 
for 15 seconds. Pick-up a maximum external payload of 5500 lb (3000 lb. average). 
Transition to ship edge height, HOGE for 15 seconds and release payload." 
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) Vertical Take off(VTO)/Hover out of ground effect (HOGE) for 15 seconds at 
instrument rated power (IRP) at Sea Level / 90 degrees F, pick up external load of 5500 
lb (3000 lb average) 
3) Climb to 150 ft Mean Sea Level (MSL) at best climb speed 
4) Transit 1000 yds with external load at 50 kts 
5) Descend to Ship Edge Height (no fuel, time or distance) 
6) HOGE for 15 sec, release payload 
7) Climb to 150 ft MSL at best climb speed 
8) Return without payload, traveling 1000 yds (Repeat cycles 2 through 8 up to 
endurance of aircraft) 
9) Reserves: greater of 10% initial fuel or fuel for 20 minutes at maximum endurance 
airspeed (Vbe ). 
VOD 
0 RD Definition: 
Vertical takeoff with a crew of 3 to HOGE with a maximum 5500 lb internal payload 
(3000 lb average). Transition to forward flight. Climb to 3500 ft MSL at best climb 
speed. Transit 100 nm at cruise airspeed. Descend to HOGE, land and discharge 
payload. 
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F 
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3) Climb to 3500 ft MSL at best climb speed 
4) Transit 100 nautical miles (NM) at 99% of best range airspeed (V99%BR) 
5) Descend Sea Level (no time, fuel or distance) 
6) HOGE, Land and Discharge Payload 
7) Reserves: greater of 10% initial fuel or fuel for 20 minutes at Vbe 
Amphibious SAR 
ORD Definition: 
Vertical takeoff and climb to 500 ft MSL. Transit 50 NM at maximum continuous power 
to search area datum. Search for 30 minutes. Descend to deploy SAR swimmer from 
either a HOGE or low altitude helocast (15 ft AGL/0 KIAS or 10  ft AGL/10 KIAS, 
respectively). Maintain HOGE for 5 minutes per person while loading up to 12 survivors 
as limited by endurance or aircraft capacity. Transition to forward flight. Climb to 500 ft 
MSL. Return to own ship at maximum speed and land. 
Analysis: 1)  Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F 
3) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed 
4) Transit 50 NM at maximum continuous power (MCP) to search area 
5) Descend to 100 ft (no time, fuel or distance) 
6) Search for 30 minutes at Vbe 
7) Descend to sea level (no time, fuel, or distance) 
8) HOGE while picking up rescuees at 5 minutes per rescuee 
9) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed 
10) Return 50 NM at MCP 
1 1 ) Descend to ship deck height (no time, fuel or distance) 




. Vertical takeoff to HOGE with a maximum payload of 5500 lb (3000 lb average) at 1000 
ft MSL, 90 degrees F, in no wind conditions. Transition to forward flight climb to 1000 
ft AGL and transit 12 NM offshore at cruise airspeed to ship. Descend to HOGE, land 
and discharge payload. 
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/HOGE for 30 seconds at IRP with payload of 5,500 lb (3,000 lb avg) at 4,000 ft 
/90 degrees F 
3) Climb to 1000 ft above ground level (AGL) 
4) Transit 12 NM offshore at cruise airspeed (V99% BR) 
5) Descend to sea level 
6) HOGE 1 minute and discharge payload 
7) Reserves: greater of 10% initial fuel or 20 minutes at Vbe 
NEO 
0 RD Definition: 
Vertical takeoff at Sea Level, 90 degrees F, climb to 2000 ft AGL, transit at maximum 
speed 100 NM to landing area. Descend to landing at 4000 ft MSL, 90 degrees F. Load 
12 evacuees (2400 lb). Vertical takeoff, climb to 2000 ft AGL (6000 ft MSL), and transit 
at maximum speed for return flight. 
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at 4,000 ft /  90 degrees F 
3) Climb to 6000 ft at best climb speed 
4) Cruise Out 100 NM at MCP speed 
5) Descend to 4,000 ft / 90 degrees F 
6) HOGE 10 minutes, pickup evacuees 
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7) Climb to 6000 ft at best climb speed 
8) Return 100 NM at MCP speed 
9) Descend to landing at 4,000 ft / 90 degrees F 
10) Reserves: Greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe 
MEDEVAC 
ORD definition: 
Vertical takeoff to HOGE with 4 SAR littered evacuees, 3 aircrewmen (2 pilots and 1 
crew chief) and 1 corpsman. Transition to forward flight. Climb to 3500 ft MSL at best 
climb speed. Transit 100 NM at cruise airspeed. Descend to HOGE, land and discharge 
payload. 
Analysis : 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F 
with 4 SAR littered evacuees + 1 corpsman 
3) Climb to 3 500 ft MSL at best climb speed 
4) Transit 100 NM at V99%BR 
5) Descend to seal level (no time, fuel or distance) 
6) Reserves: Greater of 10 % or 20 minutes at Vbe 
SWS (OW) 
ORD Definition: 
Vertical takeoff with 8 combat-equipped Naval Special Warfare (NSW) personnel and 
climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed. Transit 50 NM at maximum speed. Descend to 
deploy NSW Team from either a HOGE or low altitude helocast. Maintain HOGE for 10 
minutes while NSW team is deployed. Transit to forward flight. Climb to 500 ft MSL at 
best climb speed. Return 50 NM at cruise speed and land. 
Analysis: l )  Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
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2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F 
3) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed 
4) Cruise Out 50 NM at MCP speed 
5) Descend to Sea Level / 90 degrees F 
6) HOGE for 10 minutes, offload 8 naval special warfare (NSW) troops 
7) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed 
8) Return 50 NM at V99%BR 
9) Land with greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe 
Annex A (Armed Helicopter Missions) : 
CSAR 
ORD Definition: 
Vertical takeoff with 5 aircrew, sea level, 90 degrees F. Transit at best range speed 200 
NM at 500 ft MSL, 100 ft AGL over the last 20 NM. HOGE for 5 minutes per survivor, 
3000 ft MSL, 90 degrees F (at mid mission weight). Pick up 4 survivors at 200 lb each. 
Transition to forward flight. Descend to 500 ft MSL. Return 200 NM at best range 
airspeed and land. 
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F 
3) Cruise Out 200 NM at 500 ft at V99%BR 
4) Climb to 3,000 ft MSL / 90 degrees F at best climb speed 
5) HOGE for 5 minutes, while picking up 4 survivors 
6) Descend to 500 ft MSL 
7) Return 200 NM at V99% BR 
8) Reserves: greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe 
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SWS ( overland) 
ORD Definition: 
Vertical takeoff with 5 aircrew and 8 combat equipped NSW personnel at sea level, 90 
degrees F. Transit at best range speed 200 NM at 500 ft MSL, 100 ft AGL over the last 
20 NM. Climb to 3000 ft MSL. HOGE for 5 minutes, 3000 ft MSL, 90 degrees F and 
drop off payload. Transition to forward flight. Descend to 500 ft MSL. Return 200 NM 
at best range airspeed and land. 
Analysis: 1 )  Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F 
with 8 NSW troops 
3) Transit at 500 ft MSL 200NM at V99%BR 
4) Climb to 3,000 ft 90 degrees F at best climb speed 
5) HOGE for 5 minutes, offload troops 
6) Descend to 500 ft MSL (no time, fuel or distance) 
7) Cruise back 200 NM at V99%BR 
8) Reserves: Greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe 
suw 
ORD Definition: 
Detect and identify adversary missile patrol boats using a combination of the aircraft 's  
Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) and cueing (e.g., radar vectors to  the target) from naval 
ships and aircraft. Attack independently using a precision-guided air-to-ground missile 
or forward firing rockets/gun. In addition, the aircraft should provide air-to-surface 
targeting designation for other friendly aircraft. 
CV Plane Guard SAR 
0 RD Definition: 
Vertical takeoff and loiter for 30 minutes. Climb to 500 ft MSL. Transit out to 100 NM 
at maximum continuous power to search area datum. Search for 30 minutes. Descend to 
deploy SAR swimmer from either HOGE or low altitude helocast. Maintain HOGE for 5 
32 
minutes per person while loading 5 survivors (flight crew of E-2C). Transition to 
forward flight. Climb to 500 ft MSL. Transit 100 NM at maximum speed and land. 
Analysis: 1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F 
3) Loiter for 30 minutes 
4) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed 
5) Cruise out 100 NM at MCP 
6) Search for 30 minutes at 500 ft at best endurance speed 
7) Maintain HOGE for 5 minutes per survivor while loading 5 survivors 
8) Climb to 500 ft MSL at best climb speed 
9) Transit 100 NM at MCP speed and land 
10) Reserves: Greater of 10 % or 20 minutes at Vbe 
MIO 
MIO is not listed in the ORD, but has been verbally added as a requirement. 
1) Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F with 8 NSW troops 
3) Transit 50NM at MCP speed 
4) HOGE 15 minutes over ship 
5) Remain on station for 45 minutes 
6) Return 50 NM 
7) Reserves: Greater of 10 % or 20 minutes at Vbe 
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Additional Annex A Missions: 
Although not explicitly stated in the ORD, it is possible to conduct the CSAR and 
the SWS (Overland) missions with the aid of inflight refueling. The missions are 
conducted in the same manner as described above; however, the operator has the option 
to plan a mission based on the availability/non availability of tanker assets. Receiving 
fuel from a tanker at an appropriate time in the mission permits the operator to manage 
own aircraft gross weight and time on station/range. 
Annex B (AMCM Missions) : 
Unlike the basic missions and the Annex A missions, the AMCM missions are 
grouped based on flight regime. The ORD classifies AMCM missions as either free­
flight, hover or tow. The ALMOS mission is considered a free flight mission. The 
AMNS and RAMICS missions are considered hover and the Q-20 and OASIS missions 
are classified as tow missions. The ORD further stipulates that all AMCM missions are 
assumed to be flown sea level, 90 degrees F, and no wind. 
Free flight missions are defined in the ORD: 
Execute a vertical takeoff with up to four aircrew. Achieve AMCM mission 
radius (transit at maximum range speed 30 NM at 500 ft MSL). Perform AMCM 
mission search profile: maneuver at 60 knots ground speed for 120 minutes. 
Transition to maximum range speed at 500 ft MSL. Return 30 NM and land. 
The basic requirement for the ALMOS mission is a 2-hour on station time with a combat 
radius of 30 NM. Hover missions are similarly defined in the ORD: 
Execute a vertical takeoff with up to four aircrew. Achieve AMCM mission 
radius (transit at maximum range speed 30 NM at 500 ft MSL). Perform an 
AMCM hover mission profile: stationary hover not to exceed 30 minutes at 
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optimum mission altitudes ranging between 25-1000 feet ( depending on weapon 
system standoff requirement) followed by forward flight to acquire new target. 
Repeat this cycle for a total of 7 5 minutes. Transition to maximum range speed at 
500 ft MSL. Return 30 NM and land. 
The interpretation of the hover mission definition is that for the AMNS and RAMICS 
missions, the MH-60S is required to remain on station for a total of 7 5 minutes. During 
these 75 minutes, the aircraft would vary altitude and transition from hover to forward 
flight in order to prosecute as many mines as possible. Also included in this definition is 
the 30-mile combat radius. 
The most demanding of the AMCM missions are the towed missions. The ORD 
definition of a towed mission is: 
Execute a vertical takeoff with up to 4 aircrew. Achieve AMCM mission radius 
(transit at maximum range speed 30 NM at 500 ft MSL). Perform AMCM 
equipment deployment from the helicopter ( stationary hover at optimum 
deployment altitude for 15 minutes). Transition to AMCM tow operations at 
optimum altitude between 75 to 200 ft AGL. Perform an AMCM hunt/sweep 
mission profile (impart up to 6,000 lbs. tension) for 60 minutes. Perform AMCM 
equipment recovery on the helicopter ( stationary hover at optimum recovery 
altitude for 15 minutes). Transition to maximum range speed at 500 ft MSL. 
Return 30 NM and land. 
Further analysis yields the following profile/timeline: 
1 )  Warm-up for 5 minutes at idle power 
2) VTO/ HOGE for 1 minute at IRP at Sea Level / 90 degrees F. 
3) Transit at 500 ft MSL 30NM at V99%BR 
4) Descend to 75 ft AGL. 
5) HOGE for 15 minutes, deploy AMCM gear 
6) Climb to 125 ft AGL and tow at prescribed tension for 60 min 
7) Descend to 75 ft AGL. 
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8) HOGE for 15 minutes, recover AMCM gear 
9) Transit at 500 ft MSL 30NM at V99%BR 
10) Reserves: Greater of 10% or 20 minutes at Vbe 
The ORD places additional requirements with respect to the towed missions in the areas 
of temperature and wind limitations. For a hot (105 degree F) day, the tow requirement is 
reduced to 30 minutes with a combat radius of 10 NM. Every other parameter (as listed 
above) remains the same. The ORD also specifies that the aircraft have the capability to 
conduct tow operations with a 10 knot relative tailwind for up to 30 minutes. 
Additionally for each of the scenarios, the ORD specifies that the aircraft have the 
capability to impart up to 6,000 pounds of tension on the tow cable. 
Summary 
A summary of mission requirements is provided in Table A-1 3 • The aggregate of 
these missions define the ORD requirements for the multi-mission helicopter. Also listed 
are those missions which have been designated a key performance parameter (KPP). 
KPPs are a subset of missions deemed essential for success of the program. 
3Tables A- 1 through A-6 are included in Appendix A. 
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VI. Basic Aircraft Weight Growth 
Weight is probably the most critical design element of a new production 
helicopter. Simplistically, increase in air vehicle weight directly reduces performance 
and mission payload. Weight must be monitored closely from the initial design phases, 
throughout production, and once fielded following post-production modifications. The 
MH-60S, like any new production aircraft program, has experienced unplanned weight 
growth throughout design and production. The fact that this aircraft started out as a basic 
VERTREP aircraft replacement with planned mission growth to AMCM and armed helo 
made the control of basic weight growth critical to the success of the program. In other 
words, control of weight growth in the basic aircraft is important. The fact that this 
aircraft must "grow" to support other missions makes weight the critical design element 
in a multi-mission helicopter. 
The weight growth of the MH-60S can basically be divided into three distinct 
categories. The first category is weight growth attributed to fielding the basic airframe 
including modifications that were either planned as post production modifications or 
modifications which became necessary to correct deficiencies noted during 
developmental and operational testing. The second source of weight growth is that 
weight which is attributed to incorporating the fixed aircraft provisions for the AMCM 
and armed helicopter missions (Blocks IIA and IIIA) for the FY 2005 configurations. 
The third source of weight growth is associated with the planned increase in capability 
for the Blocks IIB and Block IIIB, C or final configuration. The last two sources of 
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weight growth are directly attributed to and result from the evolutionary strategy of 
introducing new capability to the fleet as soon as it is available. 
It was mentioned previously that the MH-60S is essentially a Black Hawk that has 
been marinized. It follows that a large contributor of the MH-60S weight growth was 
through marinization. Another factor is manufacturing variation. Despite the closest 
process controls, variation in manufacturing is ultimately unavoidable. This variation has 
also caused a net increase in basic weight. 
Marinization 
Tablel is a comparison of the weight empty of three variants of the H-60. 
The MH-60S airframe is based upon the UH-60L 'Black Hawk' which is currently in 
production for the U.S. Army. Based on the differing types of projected operating 
environments, the MH-60S required marinization of the basic Black Hawk airframe. 
Specifically, increased structure to allow for more stringent crash loading and folding 
blades in order to provide shipboard compatibility. From Table 1 ,  areas where major 
weight increase is observed is in the rotor group (387 pounds) which is attributed to blade 
fold provisions, the body group (3 17 pounds) for increased structure to handle crash 
loads, and the propulsion group (34 7 pounds) primarily for crash resistant fuel cells and 
installation of a rotor brake. Other areas where the most significant amount of weight 
increases occurred were in the electrical group, avionics group and cargo load handling 
group primarily for a rescue hoist and cargo rollers and rails. Overall, the marinization of 
the Black Hawk accounts for a weight delta of 2, 1 16 pounds or a weight growth of 1 5%. 
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TABLE 1: WEIGHT EMPTY COMPARISON (POUNDS) 
Component UH-60L HH-60H MH-60S 
92-26408 165154 165778 
Pounds 
Rotor Group 1 ,504 1 ,9 19  1 ,891  
Tail Group 424 454 461 
Body Group 2,049 2,257 2,366 
Alighting Gear Group 480 683 500 
Engine Section or Nacelle Group 197 157  198 
Air Induction Group 69 68 77 
Propulsion Group 3 ,292 3 ,528 3 ,639 
Flight Controls Group 991 1 ,068 1 ,039 
Auxiliary Power Plant Group 1 82 1 80
1 
1 83 
Instruments Group 207 266' 144 
Hydraulic & Pneumatic Group I 149 159 :  1 52 
Electrical Group 4 1 0  479 1 582 
Avionics Group 446 882 82 1 
I 
Armament Group 38  90 3 81 
Furnishings & Equipment Group 1 ,045 956 1 , 1 10  
Air Conditioning Group 57 138 1 4 1  
Anti-Icing Group 94 108 1 14 
Load & handling Group 53 1 83 345 
WEIGHT EMPTY 1 1 ,686 13,572 13,802 
Although this appears to be a fairly substantial increase in gross weight it does 
happen to be very close to the weight of the HH-60H. For comparison purposes, the HH-
60H is often referred to as the baseline or "slick" version of the H-60 family. The result 
to the Navy is two fold: ( 1 )  a new aircraft (MH-60S) is procured which contains the 
derived benefits of being common with an in production aircraft (UH-60L) and (2) the 
MH-60S is close to the weight of the baseline version of the H-60 (HH-60H) thus 




Although it is the goal of any aircraft manufacturer to improve process control, 
the fact that there will be differences between the weights of production aircraft as they 
leave the line remain. Many parts of the MH-60S are made through high-speed 
machining and then built up by hand. The ultimate result is multiple tolerances and 
variation in basic weight. 
The variation in basic weight for the MH-60S is addressed in the aircraft 
specification. Based on historical data, Sikorsky has seen variations in weights up to ½% 
of the average empty weight. In the case of the MH-60S, the specification contingency 
weight is 70 pounds. The weight between aircraft can vary as great as 70 pounds and still 
be acceptable. This total amount of weight must be included when doing performance 
calculations and throughout the course of planning for additional missions. 
Integrated Maintenance Diagnostic/Health Usage Monitoring System 
(IMO/HUMS) 
The !MD/HUMS system was a planned improvement to the MH-60S from the 
early design stages. It is completely unrelated to the weight growth experienced as a 
result of multi-mission. Once incorporated into the aircraft, this system will add a total of 
73 pounds to the gross weight. It is anticipated that the IMO/HUMS modification once 




Throughout the developmental and operational flight test of an aircraft it is not 
uncommon to discover design deficiencies that require correction prior to fleet release . 
. In the case of the MH-60S, a deficiency noted during flight test was the low/medium 
frequency vibrations at airspeeds typically flown during the VERTREP mission. This 
deficiency was listed as a Part I, which means that it had to be corrected immediately. 
As the design of the aircraft continues to mature and more hours are flown it is 
anticipated that the vibratory nature of the VERTREP flight regime may result in 
airframe changes and future weigh growth. The initial repair to the vibrations is to 
modify a vibration absorber on the main rotor head with an ultimate weight growth of 
twelve pounds. 
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VII. Multi-Mission Weight Growth 
It was mentioned that basic airframe weight growth as a result of making the 
aircraft capable of more missions is the key design constraint to the multi-mission 
helicopter. Prior to evaluating the specific amount of weight anticipated as a result of 
increased mission capability it would be beneficial to understand how air systems are 
introduced into a helicopter. It is fairly common, especially in aircraft that have more 
than one mission, to develop a mission kit. This is the approach that was used in the 
design of the MH-60S. The kit contains items that are not in the basic aircraft 
configuration which permit the aircraft to perform other missions. 
A mission kit is typically comprised of two parts: an A-kit and a B-kit. The A-kit 
is defined as fixed aircraft provisions. As the name implies, A-kit items are fixed and 
become a part of the basic aircraft. An example of an A-kit item would be structural 
modifications to allow the structure to withstand increased fatigue loads. The B-kit parts 
are removable items that are installed prior to the specific mission and removed upon 
completion. An example of a B-kit item would be the common console for AMCM that is 
installed prior to AMCM missions and then removed. 
It follows that in the design of a multi-mission helicopter there is an optimal 
balance between A-kit and B-kit items. If the shift favors a large number of A-kit items 
then the aircraft must carry this extra weight regardless of mission. If the shift favors a 
large amount of B-kit items then there is a commensurate increase in logistics support 
requirements and the time it takes for aircraft reconfiguration between missions. 
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Armed Helicopter Weight 
Based on a review of the ORD missions and multiple meetings with the requirements 
officer, a list of assumptions for armed helicopter were generated. These assumptions 
ultimately drove the makeup of the A-kit for armed helicopter. The A-kits and 
corresponding weight that are required for the armed helicopter are summarized in Table 
2. In aggregate, the weight increase to the basic gross weight due to armed helicopter A­
kit items is 391 pounds. This represents an increase of 3% to the empty weight of the 
MH-60S as it was originally designed. 
AMCM Weight Growth 
AMCM, because it involves towing a device in the water, brings with it a requirement for 
a large amount of structural modifications to the base aircraft. In order to tow a Q-20A 
and the OASIS, a "tow point" must be added to the aircraft with its corresponding 
structural support. The "bath tub", portrayed in figure B-5, represents the major 
structural member of the aft transition section of the MH-60S. This area required 
modifications for the tow point as well as the incorporation of fittings that would in tum 
accept floor tie downs for AMCM equipment including a winch and a CSTRS (Common 
Stream Tow Recovery System). Specific modification of this area included the addition 
of beams and widening of structural members. Additionally, it is planned that the 
RAMICS system will cause structural modifications as a result of the relatively large 
amount of recoil associated with this gun system. In addition to structural modifications, 
AMCM capability requires the addition of a fourth hydraulic system in order to power 
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TABLE 2: ARMED HELICOPTER WEIGHT GROWTH (A-KITS) 
Item Weight (lbs) 
Auxiliary fuel tank provisions 36 
Refueling probe provisions 68 
Link 16 12 
CSAR/Integrated self defense items 
Avionics rack provisions 
GAU-16/19 structural provisions 
EFS fixed forward fire provisions 




Mission computer provisions 
FLIR hand control unit (HCU) 
AN/ APR-39 provisions 
Total Armed Helicopter A-kit 391 
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a winch, as well as power distribution provisions. The total weight of the A-kit for 
AMCM is 333 pounds or a 2% weight growth. 
Associated with AMCM (and most likely the AH mission) is the requirement for 
a tactical data link. The plan is also to make this a "kitable" item with a resultant A-kit 
weight of 57 pounds. 
The resultant increase in aircraft gross weight as a result of the multi-mission 
requirement is summarized in Table A-2. Ifwe combine this weight growth with the 
weight associated with marinization (Table 1 ), the weight associated with pre planned 
improvements (IMD HUMS), and the weight associated with resolution of discrepancies 
identified in testing (to date), the overall impact to the basic aircraft as a result of 
designing a multi-mission helicopter is derived in Table B-3. Table B-3 shows the 
realized impact of modifying a helicopter that was originally designed to perform only 
VERTREP to a helicopter that has the provisions to perform multiple types of missions. 
An increase of approximately 1000 pounds to the empty gross weight was an unplanned 
result of adding these provisions. Further, the significance of an unplanned event implies 
little to no funds or schedule available to make changes. 
It should be noted that the Navy was able to make small, initial adjustments to the 
design to allow for the increased gross weight. These adjustments included removal of a 
row of crew seats, the use of lighter fuel tanks, and lighter pilot seats. Regardless, the 
initial attempt at weight savings was only 140 pounds. 
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Mission Kits 
The real significance of the 1000-pound increase in aircraft empty gross weight is 
graphically displayed as aircrew, fuel, and mission kits (B-kits) are added. Table 3 lists 
the projected operating gross weights for each mission planned for the MH-60S for the 
FY 2007 or final configuration. 
TABLE 3 :  OPERATING GROSS WEIGHT 
Mission Gross Weight, Pounds 
VERTREP 21000 
VOD 22330 




SWS (OW) 20662 
CSAR 22596 
CV Plane Guard 22000 
SWS (OL) 22914 







VIII. Limiting Aircraft Performance Factors 
The previous discussion of the unplanned weight increase as a result of the spiral 
acquisition strategy would not be a problem if the MH-60S had unlimited performance 
capabilities. This is obviously not the case. In fact, the MH-60S ORD requirements were 
based on the current perfonnance of the HH-60H. As the weight empty of the MH-60S is 
projected to be approximately 1000 pounds heavier than the HH-60H and both aircraft 
share a common drive train and rotor head, it follows that the MH-60S will be incapable 
of completing its ORD missions without a combination of a weight reduction program or 
performance enhancements. 
The definition of limiting performance factors as applied to this thesis is the 
causes for the difference between the planned multi-mission helicopter performance 
based on the HH-60H capabilities and the realized performance of the MH-60S. 
Throughout the development of the MH-60S these limiting factors ranged from limits of 
the basic aircraft due to gross weight to performance limitations as a result of ORD 
interpretation. An example of a limiting performance factor as a result of ORD 
interpretation is invoking of a requirement for a power margin or the existence of excess 
torque to provide a safety margin in certain situations. 
In a helicopter designed for a specific type of mission, the range of operating 
environments is bound. For example, a helicopter which is designed to perform 
VER TREP and other fleet support missions would be expected to perform its mission 
carrying cargo either ship to ship or ship to shore. In the case of the MH-60S, the 
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requirement for multiple missions means that the helicopter will operate in a wide range 
of operating regimes. These regimes range from overland while conducting the SWS 
(OL) mission to high altitude while conducting the airhead mission to low over water 
while towing a Q-20 in the AMCM role. This operating range essentially covers every 
possible regime that a helicopter could be expected to operate in. The unplanned increase 
in weight empty combined with the requirement to include extra safety margin serve 
further to reduce future capability of the MH-60S 
Gross Weight 
Regardless of the mission, helicopters have a given amount of power available 
limited either by engine or transmission performance. The MH-60S NATOPS lists the 
maximum gross weight as 23,500 lbs. This is the maximum structural limitation of the 
aircraft. NA TOPS currently lists the maximum internal weight as 22,500 lbs. Based on 
Table 3, the maximum gross weight is not a factor in the final MH-60S configuration. 
The maximum internal gross weight on some missions, however, does now become a 
limiting factor resulting in a reduction in the amount of fuel that can be carried with a 
resultant decrease in range/endurance. 
Issues occur in helicopter design when the maximum gross weight must be set 
lower than the maximum structural gross weight. This is usually a result of 
developmental testing where a specific flying quality results in a reduced maximum gross 
weight. This also happens to be the case in the MH-60S. During dynamic interface 
testing conducted as a part of MH-60S developmental testing it was noted that at gross 
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weights in excess of 22,000 pounds unacceptable pilot workload was required in the 
approach to landing regime on combatant ships ( destroyers and frigates). As a result of 
these adverse handling qualities a recommendation out of developmental test was to limit 
the maximum takeoff gross weight of the MH-60S to 22000 pounds when operating from 
small decks. This requirement would not apply when operating from larger decks such as 
L-Class ships (LPD, LHD, LHA) and aircraft carriers. Since the ORD requires the MH-
60S to operate from combatants, the 22000 maximum gross weight further limits aircraft 
performance. 
Hover Out of Ground Effect (HOGE) Limits 
Another aircraft limitation is the maximum weight at which the helicopter can 
hover out of ground effect. This weight applies to shipboard takeoffs where in most 
cases the aircraft will be in an out of ground effect hover as soon as it clears the deck 
edge. The maximum weight an aircraft can hover out of ground effect is a function of 
power available which is a function of ambient conditions. 
Most of the ORD missions are based on sea level/ 90 degrees F or 3000 ft/90 
degrees F. Utilizing the hover charts in the MH-60S NATO PS, the aircraft can HOGE at 
22,650 lbs sea level/90 degrees F and 20,200 lbs 3000 ft/90 degrees F. Referring to the 
mission profiles chapter in this thesis, the requirement to HOGE applies to any mission 
which starts out from the ship as well as the missions which have a specific mid-mission 
HOGE requirement such as SWS (OL). Once again, comparing these weights to the 
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operating weights in Table 3, the increased gross weight as a result of multi­
mission provisions has a negative affect on aircraft performance. 
Takeoff Criteria 
Takeoff criterion, or the amount of power available for a safety margin, has been 
a subject of discussion for many years. Helicopter performance is based on shaft 
horsepower produced by the engines (power available) and shaft horsepower required by 
the main and tail rotors, drive system and accessories (power required). In a flight test 
quality, still air hover, power available equals power required and the helicopter neither 
climbs nor descends. For this to happen the pilot determines for a given pressure altitude 
and environmental condition the engine power available and the gross weight requiring 
that power available. For the heaviest gross weight there is no power margin. 
The expression power margin and torque margin are sometimes used 
interchangeably. Because pilots fly based on a torque setting, shaft horsepower is 
converted mathematically to a torque value. The pilot flies based on a torque setting 
where 1 00% correspond to a reference amount of power (2828 shaft horsepower for the 
H-60) at 100% main rotor revolutions per minute (RPM). Furthermore, pilots calculate 
mission parameters based on torque available and torque required. The ability to hover 
with a 10% torque margin is calculated utilizing the NA TOPS performance charts 
artificially reducing the engine power available by 10%. 
The specific torque margin discussions, however are typically held in an ad hoc 
manner as part of pilot training, ready room discussions, NATO PS manuals, and unit 
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level operating procedures. The inclusion of this safety margin has never been included 
in the design phase of a helicopter because historically missions were not planned to 
- utilize 100% of the power available for takeoff and hover. As the basic operating weight 
of the MH-60S increases, many missions will in fact require 100% of the power available 
(prior to any future weight reduction program). Naturally, the definition of power margin 
in the case of the MH-60S cannot be left to the post-design audience and now must be 
addressed at the Systems Command level prior to IOC. Further, the varying opinions on 
this subject make it very difficult to formalize. 
In the case of the multi-mission helicopter, the ORD specifies mission takeoff 
gross weight. For example, in the CSAR mission the direction is " . . .  vertical takeoff to 
HOGE with 5 aircrew, sea level, 90 degrees F . . . .  " The operational evaluation 
(OPEV AL) pilots will be applying a 10% torque margin to power available to determine 
takeoff gross weight (TOGW), based on common fleet procedures. Since the mission 
will have allocated 100% of the power available for takeoff, the addition of the 10% will 
exceed the power available and not permit conduct of the mission. 
Currently, the requirement for a torque margin capability varies by aircraft and by 
service: For example, many of the wind envelopes that list wind limits for takeoff and 
landing from ships prescribe a specific torque margin. The HH-60H NATOPS prescribes 
a 10% torque margin for takeoffs from the aircraft carrier, Spruance class destroyers, and 
oilers. 
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Vertical Rate of Climb (VROC) 
The same discussion for torque margin in a HOGE also applies to VROC. 
Specifically, the "practice" of applying additional margin which ensures that the pilot 
will have excess power to climb in a given situation. As in the previous discussion, the 
concept of a VROC margin is discussed because the aircraft is required to do all 
missions. Obviously torque margin and VROC are related. If there is a torque margin 
then there is the ability for the aircraft to climb. In the case of the H-60, a 5-6% torque 
margin yields a 500 foot per minute (fpm) VRQC. VROC is typically planned when 
dealing with maneuvering flight such as in the AH and some of the combat support 
missions such as NEO. The CSAR maneuver guide, for example, requires that during 
mission planning a percent torque margin for all maneuvers be established which 
ultimately indicates the level of risk. A margin of greater than I 0% is indicative of low 
risk whereas a torque margin of less than 5% would indicate a high-risk flight. Similarly, 
the H-60F/H NATOPS states that power equal to HOGE plus 5% may be required during 
the waveoff or landing abort from a confined area landing site. 
Other sources of comparison on this issue include the Army ORD for the Black 
Hawk and ADS-33 Flying Qualities Specification. For the Army ORD, the design 
requirement is 4000 ft/95 degrees F, using 95% takeoff power and 500 foot per minute 
VROC. This satisfies the real world requirement to hover OGE at 6000 ft/95 degrees F. 
The number 500 fpm VROC is also mentioned in ADS-33 as a steady state requirement 
for level I (the best) handling qualities. 
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The question that is unclear is how much margin or VROC capability is required 
for each situation. The answer to whether which should be the metric a 10% torque 
margin or a 500 fpm VROC is subject to debate. The bottom line is that some ability to 
establish a vertical rate of climb is necessary. The 500 fpm VROC, however, is not a 
rigorously defendable or traceable value. Currently, the answer is very subjective with the 
answers all over the scale from a 0% requirement to at least 10%. Regardless of the 
answer, the fact remains that there are different requirements driving the MH-60S design. 
The ORD allows for zero margin because 100% of the performance is utilized for the 
mission yet the test community and the fleet will expect a torque margin of some degree. 
The addition of the airframe provisions for all of the missions makes a torque margin 
unachievable without weight reduction or performance enhancements. 
Engine Degradation 
Another damaging performance assumption is the calculation of aircraft 
performance with perfect or specification-level engines. The measurement for the 
relative health of an engine is the Average Torque Factor or ATF. A 1.0 engine is an 
engine that produces 100% of the specified power or 2828 shaft horsepower (SHP) at 
1 00% main rotor speed. Since the missions mandated by the ORD require 100% of the 
power available once the final configuration weight is added, there was no allowance for 
degraded engines. ·  Adding to the problem is the fact that the average engine in the fleet 
today is less than 1 .0 and is usually closer to a 0.93 or 7% degraded. 
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In a sense, there are three end users of the MH-60S, the requirements officers who 
author the ORD, the operational testers who verify ORD compliance, and ultimately the 
fleet. The ORD remains silent on the ATF and the VROC values. In order to maximize 
the performance in light of the increased weight for multi-mission provisions, it is 
necessary to plan on the availability of 100% of the power available. For this reason, 
performance calculations based on the ORD used the least conservative values of 1.0 
A TF and O VROC. This serves to understate the weight and performance issues for both 
the acquisition and requirements community. VX-1, the operational test squadron, will 
perform the operational testing with MH-60S aircraft that are projected to have 
approximately 200 flight hours on them. It is not unreasonable to expect that the engines 
will have degraded to less than a 1.0 ATF. Furthermore, it is not clear what torque 
margin will be utilized for mission planning but it is not unreasonable to assume that it 
will be greater than 0%. Last and possibly most important is the fleet projection for the 
MH-60S. Based on current employment of the H-60 in the fleet, the average engine will 
have an ATF of 0.93 and a VROC of 500 fpm will be used as a planning metric. 
The excessive weight growth as a result of multi-mission is a large enough 
problem in itself. The problem is compounded by unclear and perhaps more stringent 
than planned performance requirements. Weight growth is a fairly easy problem to 
understand. As aircraft provisions are added in order to make the aircraft multi-mission 
capable, aircraft empty gross weight subsequently increases. The performance related 
issues are somewhat less easy to understand and even harder to foresee as a result of the 
multi-mission requirement. The performance limiting factors are an intangible problem 
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associated with an aircraft that must perform many missions. An example would be an 
attack helicopter that must have excess power available in order to perform evasive or 
offensive maneuvers. The same amount of excess power may not be required in a 
transport helicopter that may only have a torque margin requirement to allow a safety 
buffer when landing and taking off from the ship. Since the MH-60S must conduct both 
of these mission in addition to many others, there is no one answer which will drive the 
multi-mission design. 
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IX. Mission Shortfalls 
A simple analysis ·of the projected gross weight combined with the performance 
degradation demonstrates the fact that the MH-60S will be unable to meet all of the ORD 
missions in the FY 07 configuration. Tables A-4 and A-5, developed by the NA VAIR 
Performance Branch, show projected mission performance in each mission profile. In 
cases where capability is limited, the limiting factor is also listed. 
For Tables A-4 and A-5, the white color indicates that the aircraft can meet the 
mission without weight reduction or performance enhancement. The light gray indicates 
that the aircraft is limited as a result of a HOGE limit or gross weight limit, but could 
meet the mission if the requirements were reduced by a minimum amount. Dark gray is a 
take off gross weight excursion. In many cases, the aircraft does not meet the mission 
using the ORD assumptions (1.0 ATF/0 FPM VROC). When realistic parameters are 
applied (0.93 ATF/500 FPM VROC), the performance deficit is made greater. 
Furthermore, as the weight empty increases, the MH-60S is unable to perform the base 
missions 
The large number of missions and associated variables that must be analyzed 
becomes a cumbersome task. The analysis can be simplified by comparing limiting 
factors (gross weight and engine performance) to the various VROC and A TF 
combinations. This analysis, presented in Table A-6, when performed for each mission 
clearly summarizes MH-60S mission performance. 
In Table A-6, the first number is the number of missions that the aircraft is able to 
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perform. The number following the slash is the number of missions that are 
limited by either gross weight or a performance limit. For example, for the seven basic 
ORD missions, the aircraft can meet six of the requirements based on a 1.0 ATF and 0 
VROC requirement. As 0.93 ATF and a 500 FPM VROC -is added the aircraft can only 
complete four of the seven missions. 
It is apparent from the previous analyses that in the final configuration of the MH-
60S, a combination of weight and reduction and performance enhancements will be 
required. Rather than analyzing each mission, the most restrictive missions should be 
analyzed. Specifically, mitigation paths need to be developed for the CSAR unrefueled, 
SWS(OL), MIO, and the Q-20A (tropical and hot day) missions. Resolution to the 
shortfalls to these design critical missions will obviously optimize the overall aircraft 
capabilities. 
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X. Weight Savings Options 
Obviously, the most efficient method to reduce weight in an aircraft is in the 
design phase prior to 'bending of metal' . Since the requirement to reduce weight in the 
MH-60S was not clearly identified until the post-production phase, the impact of a weight 
reduction program will be significant. The task of identifying the easiest ways to 
eliminate weight will be difficult. The difficulty of this task is compounded by the fact 
that the aircraft is already in production and any changes may have to be retrofitted to 
aircraft already delivered. The options to save weight can be compared utilizing many 
factors such as cost, time to implement, ease of implementation, factory or field 
modifications, and technological difficulty. For purposes of this thesis, options will be 
categorized by ease of implementation. 
Low Technology Insertion 
Weight reduction options classified as low technology insertion utilize already in 
production components which are 'form, fit, and function' components, but obviously 
lighter than the current MH-60S component. One example of this is replacement of the 
current pilot seats with a lighter version. This lighter version of the pilot seat has the 
same function as the existing armored seats in the MH-60S and currently under 
development for the Army UH-60M aircraft. Once development is complete, it is 
expected that these seats will be 30 pounds lighter than the existing seats for a total 
weight reduction of 60 pounds. 
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Other examples of low technology insertion include lightweight fuel cells and the 
addition of a kitable HIRSS (Helicopter Infrared Suppression System). Like, the 
lightweight pilot seats, weight savings technology employed in the UH-60M can be 
transferred to the MH-60S. In addition, new, lighter materials could be utilized to 
fabricate the fuel tank. The tank used in the UH-60M is approximately 25 pounds lighter. 
The UH-60M tanks in conjunction with a lighter material could save as much as 75 
pounds in the MH-60S. 
The HIRSS as currently installed on the MH-60S is a permanent change to the 
engine exhaust. The HIRSS is only required for missions where the risk of exposure to 
enemy IR missiles is high. For the AMCM and many of the basic missions the HIRSS is 
extra weight that also happens to decrease the performance of the engine. There 
currently exist two different designs that permit the HIRSS to be removed and reinstalled 
when dictated by mission. Weight savings associated with removal of the HIRSS is 175 
pounds. The associated increase in engine performance is approximately equal to 125 
pounds in a hover (2% increase in SHP). Although, this provision will not help the 
armed helicopter missions it does represent a sizeable weight reduction for AMCM. 
Other relatively simple changes include the use of lighter materials such as 
titanium instead of steel hydraulic lines and fasteners or the increased use of composites. 
Although these changes are relatively simple from a technology standpoint they do 
represent changes that are costly and more difficult to implement. 
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Medium Technology Insertion 
As the technological level of the proposed change to the aircraft becomes 
increasingly difficult, the level of analysis required also increases. An example of a 
medium technology insertion weight reduction option is the replacement of the aluminum 
horizontal stabilator with a composite stabilator. This design is currently planned for the 
UH-60M so the U.S. Navy would be in a position where they would either have to accept 
the U.S. Army testing or conduct their own test program. The replacement of this 
component, because it is safety critical, would require an extensive test program and 
structural analysis. 
The fourth hydraulic system installed as part of the AMCM aircraft provisions can 
also be evaluated as a potential area of weight savings. Although it is planned that the 
actual pump will be removed from the gearbox for all non-AMCM missions, the weight 
of the plumbing and the reservoir will be a weight penalty for all missions. An 
alternative to the fourth hydraulic pump is the design and fabrication of an electric motor 
for the AMCM winch. The motor would be installed as part of the AMCM B-kit. Impact 
to the aircraft is obviously an analysis of the electrical loads and the actual design 
modifications to the current winch and associated control system. Potential savings for 
an electric winch are anticipated to be approximately 82 pounds. 
Another example of the medium technology insertion weight reduction is the 
elimination of the fourth aircrewman for the AMCM mission. The weight that is planned 
per crewman is 250 pounds. The design plan for the AMCM mission was a minimal 
level of integration. In other words, the mission is planned to be executed by the 2 
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crewmen in the rear of the aircraft. The pilots would of course be responsible for 
minefield navigation and overall conduct of the mission. An example of the minimal 
level of integration is that during the stream process of a Q-20, the pilots are unable to 
monitor the status of the device. The plan is that one crewman would actually be 
operating the winch while the other crewman would be controlling/monitoring the device 
from the console; Once under tow, the fourth crewman would not have much to do until 
the recovery process. Increasing the level of integration so that such stream and recovery 
tasks could be conducted by the crewman sitting at the console with monitoring being 
performed up front by the pilots. A simple analysis indicates that the majority of this 
integration would be related to increasing the amount of information on the data bus and 
subsequently making it available to the pilots. In other words, there would be little 
weight penalty associated with the removal of the fourth crewman and the associated 
seat. Further analysis, both in the human factors, crew systems and avionics arenas are 
obviously required. 
High Technology Insertion 
High technology insertion items are those items that either represent the latest in 
helicopter design or require a large amount of analysis and test. It follows that this 
category would drive the largest impact to the design of the MH-60S and most likely take 
the longest amount of time. Examples of high technology items include fly by wire 
technology, wide chord main rotor blades, and active vibration control. There are also 
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opportunities for insertion of technology for the purpose of weight decrease in AMCM in 
the area of lighter tow cables and a weight reduction study for the AMCM sensors. 
Cost 
Throughout this section there was no mention of the cost of each of the options. 
Similar to the design phase for an aircraft, cost per pound of weight lost can be 
calculated. The previous discussion covered the wide range of changes that can be made 
in order to lose weight. Because this part of the MH-60S was never initially planned, the 
correct choice will obviously be based on fiscal constraints and how to get the largest 
weight reduction for the lowest price with the least impact to the schedule. 
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XI. Performance Improvements 
In addition to an aggressive weight reduction program, the growth of the MH-60S 
has resulted in a requirement to improve helicopter performance. The most compelling 
reason is the need to increase takeoff gross weight and hover performance in the SWS, 
CSAR and AMCM missions. Increased TOGW will permit the aircraft to leave the flight 
deck with the requisite amount of fuel and mission equipment in order to meet the 
combat radii mandated in the ORD mission profiles. As in the weight reduction program, 
however, any performance enhancement decision must be based on impact to the aircraft. 
This section is not intended to be inclusive; rather it is intended to demonstrate the 
problems associated with even the simplest methods of increasing helicopter performance 
in a postproduction environment. 
There are many ways to increase the performance capabilities of a helicopter. An 
obvious example would be through the use of wide chord main rotor blades mentioned in 
the previous section. Another tactic is to evaluate the drive train and engines. A 
simplistic explanation of this area is that the aircraft performance is limited by the 
amount of power the engines can produce or limited by the amount of torque that the 
main gearbox can accept. As an example, the main gearbox of the MH-60S is limited to 
· 120% torque at airspeeds less than 80 knots. The only way to increase the ability to 
accept increased shaft horsepower from the engines is to replace the gearbox. This is an 
example of a performance enhancing change which would be cost and schedule 
prohibitive since it would involve a completely new design not currently installed in any 
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H-60 variant. There are cases, however, where the MH-60S is limited by the engine 
power available and not gearbox input torque. 
Engines 
The engines currently installed in the aircraft are designated T700-401 C engines. 
For normal operating conditions, pilots operate this engine within their maximum 
continuous turbine temperature specified in the NA TOPS manual. When additional 
power is required, the MH-60S NATOPS provides for an Instrument Rated Power (IRP) 
setting for up to 30 minutes. Although not approved for use in the Navy variants of the 
H-60, the U.S. Army also uses the T700, but has an additional IO-minute rating which 
permits a time limited availability of increased shaft horsepower. This directly increases 
the ability to hover in warm weather where the aircraft is engine limited. 
Although implementing a 10 minute limit on the -401 C engine seems like an 
'easy' method to increase hot day hover performance, there is a large amount of analysis 
which must be performed. With this increased demand on the engine is the 
commensurate decrease in engine service life. Further analysis to determine exact life 
penalty for this requirement. At the very least, an increase in engine asset availability 
would be required throughout the fleet. 
The U.S. Army is currently testing a new version of the T700 engine, the T-700-
701D, for use in the UH-60M. This engine, if approved for use in the MH-60S would 
provide for up to 4% increase in shaft horsepower that equates to several hundred pounds 
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of increased lift capability. Like the previous example, however, a large amount of 
analysis and testing would be required prior to implementation. 
Increased Nr 
Another example of increasing takeoff and hover performance is by increasing 
main rotor RPM. Increasing Nr would have two effects on performance. The first effect 
would be in handling qualities where the main rotor would provide increased control 
power at higher speeds. This would allow pilots to set a higher RPM when taking off and 
landing at high gross weight from the ship. The second area where increased RPM 
increases performance is at sea level conditions where the aircraft would be main gearbox 
torque limited if the -401 D engine were installed. 
Currently, the MH-60S is designed to operate at 100% Nr. In helicopter design, 
the main rotor RPM impacts may areas. Prior to approving operations at any increased 
rotor speed, effects to the engines, vibratory signature, electrical power, and dynamic 
components would have to be evaluated. An additional impact is that in the current 
design there is no method to set an Nr at any value over 101.5%. The control system 
would have to be modified to allow the pilot to set t:Jr at 103 or 105%. 
Engine Health 
In Chapter VIII, the fact that the ORD considered that the engines were operating 
at 1.0 ATF or were producing specification power is challenging In actuality, the 
average engine in the fleet is degraded as much as 7% thereby decreasing power 
available. Given an unlimited supply of engines and manpower, an engine would be 
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removed and replaced as soon as its health decreased below 100%. Reality has driven the 
removal criteria to 0.93. Anything that can be done from an engine logistics and 
reliability/maintainability standpoint would serve to indirectly increase MH-60S 
performance. An example of this might be robust compressor blades that are less 
susceptible to erosion from salt spray and sand. By affecting the overall health of the 
engines in the fleet so that the average engine becomes a 0.95 ATF, performance gains 
would be realized without directly changing anything on the aircraft. 
Similar to the weight reduction discussion, the correct performance enhancement 
solution will be a combination of various items. A prime example would be the 
incorporation of the -701 D engines with increased main rotor RPM for takeoffs and 
landings. The goal, of course, must be to increase the performance abilities of the 
aircraft so that the maximum takeoff gross weight specified in the NA TOPS of 23 ,500 
pounds could be realized. 
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XII. Recommendations 
The on-going and planned multi-mission modifications to the MH-60S pose many 
unprecedented challenges for the Naval Aviation Systems Command and contractor 
teams. In theory, its intended mission should drive the design of a helicopter. The most 
stringent missions should play a major role in the design characteristics. In the case of 
the MH-60S, however, the challenge becomes weight reduction and performance 
enhancements in a production helicopter. In order to compensate for the impacts of the 
multi-mission capability, the following should be investigated: 
1 .  Requirements Definition: The requirements were written utilizing current mission 
needs that were in tum based on a dedicated platform for each mission. No regard was 
given for the potential degradation in performance resulting from one aircraft performing 
many diverse missions. The fact that the MH-60S will be organic to the battle group and 
able to be used for many missions at the discretion of the Battle Group Commander is an 
enhancing characteristic that is not currently taken into account by the requirements 
generation process. The current requirements need to be re-evaluated based on the actual 
requirements and not based on the capability of the legacy aircraft. Additionally, the 
derived benefit of having this asset readily available should be factored in. 
2. Spiral performance 'buy back' : Weight reduction studies and performance 
enhancements should be evaluated based on cost and benefits. Once decided upon, . 
"performance" should be "bought back" along the same schedule as the spiral acquisition 
path. An example of such a performance buy back plan follows: 
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•Block 2A - FY03 
-Kitable HIRSS 
-New pilot seats (from the UH-60M) 
-Fuel tank ( from the UH-60M) 
•Block 3A - FY05 
-Utilize refueling probe 
-Reduce unrefueled range requirement in ORD 
-Reduce number of SWS(OL) crew in ORD 
•Block 3B - FY06 
-401 D Engine upgrade 
-Develop active vibration controls to allow increased Nr operations 
--Composite stabilator 
•Block 2B - FY07 
-Tow cable or removal of fourth AMCM crewman 
-4th stage hydraulic pump removal 
As new capability is added a commensurate amount of performance should be substituted 
through a combination of weight reduction, performance enhancements, and 
requirements analysis. A plan of this type should be added to the acquisition strategy and 
incorporated as part of the production line for each block. 
3. Mission Analysis: Rather than analyzing 20 different missions, the requirements 
should be based on a subset containing the most stringent missions. The task of analyzing 
many different missions and all possible variations is difficult as shown in Chapter V. 
The task could be simplified by only defining/mandating requirements for 
the most stringent base mission, the most stringent armed helicopter mission and the most 
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stringent AMCM mission. These mission profiles would drive future weight 
reduction/performance enhancements. It follows that if the most difficult missions were� 
considered, overall performance of the air vehicle would be optimized. 
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XIII. Conclusion 
Even the brief analyses presented in this thesis demonstrate the intricacies 
involved in the conduct of the AMCM and armed helicopter missions. The weight growth 
associated with increasing the MH-60S capabilities was not planned. The mission 
profiles are reminiscent of the way that the missions are currently conducted with 
platforms dedicated to that specific mission; specifically, the MH-53E for the AMCM 
mission and the HH-60H for the armed helicopter mission. Inevitably some mission 
profiles will have to be reduced as there is no compensation planned for the synergies 
gained by conducting all missions in one aircraft. 
Design requirements for a helicopter can be thought of as a chair with four legs. 
Each leg can be symbolized by the following design attributes: weight, performance, 
engines, and requirements. The first three are not easily changed once the aircraft is in 
production. The fourth is relatively easy to change. 
If the MH-60S were a new aircraft it would have a specification that detailed 
engine ratings, transmission limits, rotor disk area, tip speed, solidity, and mission 
performance calculations with clearly stated ground rules. Additionally, design work 
would be performed taking the necessity of additional margin into account. This would 
be required to allow for weight growth and performance degradation over the life cycle. 
The decision to transition to one type of helicopter for the U.S. Navy has been the 
subject of many studies. This strategy, officially adopted as part of the HMP, will change 
the way the Navy of the future operates both tactically and fiscally. 
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The multi-mission concept will have many tangible and intangible effects. The 
tangible effects will be the cost associated with a weight reduction and performance 
enhancement upgrades to the MH-60S. Intangible and unknown impacts will be the 
potential sub optimization of each mission the MH-60S will be required to perform. 
It is not possible for an aircraft to do all missions perfectly. Nor is it possible for 
the MH-60S to perform to the same level as an aircraft that was optimized for a particular 
mission. The resultant situation is that the Navy will be forced to purchase an aircraft that 
can do all missions to an acceptable level. The acceptable level will have to be arrived at 
based on revision of the way the Navy currently operates. 
It is surmised that this acceptable level will someday, once again based on weight 
reduction and performance enhancements, be within the limits of the MH-60S. If the 
MH-60S cannot perform all missions at this acceptable level then there are one of three 
outcomes. The first and least desirable is that the Navy accepts the fact that it will not 
meet war fighting requirements. The second is that the Navy aborts the one type aircraft 
plan. The third is that the Navy operates a 'split' fleet of MH-60S aircraft where some 
aircraft are designated VERTREP only, some are AMCM only and some are armed 
helicopter only. 
Of course, the above postulation over simplifies the situation and does not take 
into account advancement in tactics and war fighting technology associated with 
integrating the latest, state of the art sensors and weapons into the MH-60S . It does serve 
however to demonstrate the magnitude of the decision to transition to the MH-60S for all 
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missions. It also highlights the difficulty of designing for many missions let alone 
making post production changes to account for multi-mission related airframe changes. 
The plan to utilize one helicopter for many missions is clearly highly pragmatic. 
The cost and final capability once all modifications are complete is yet to be seen. The 
only way the program will succeed is through continued analysis and careful planning to 
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Appendix A: Tables 
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TABLE A-1: SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS 
MISSION KPP PAYLOAD ENDURANCE RANGE(nm) 
(hrs) 
VERTREP YES 5500 lbs 1 .7 hrs --
VOD YES 5500 lbs -- 1 00 nm 
AMPHID SAR YES Up to 1 2  -- 50 nm 
Airhead - 5500 lbs -- 1 2 nm 
NEO -- 1 2 pax - 1 00 nm 
MEDEVAC -- 4 pax -- 1 00 nm 
SWS(OW) - 8 troops -- 50 nm 
MISSION KPP TOS (min) ROA (nm) 
AQS-20X /OASIS Trop Day YES 60 min 30 nm 
AQS-20X/OASIS Hot Day YES 30 min 1 0 nm 
ALMOS YES 1 20 min 30 nm 
AMNS {Tethered) YES 75 min 30 nm 
RAMICS YES 75 min 30 nm 
MISSION KPP PAYLOAD RANGE (nm) 
CSAR YES 4 Pax 200 nm 
SWS(OL) YES 8 Troops 200 nm 
MIO YES 8 Troops 50 nm 
ASUW -- -- --
CV PLN GD 5 Pax 1 00 nm 
(Source: PMA Brief) 
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TABLE A-2: MULTI-MISSION GROSS WEIGHT IMPACT 
Item Weight (lbs) 
Armed Helicopter A-Kit 391 




TABLE A-3: H-60 WEIGHT GROWTH 
Item Weight (lbs) 
MH-60S weight empty (UH-60L plus 13,802 
marinization weight) 
IMD/HUMS 73 
Manufacturing Variation 70 
Discrepancy resolution (Vibration 1 2  
absorbers) 
A-Kits 78 1 
Total 14,738 
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TABLE A-4: MISSION PROFILE SUMMARY (BASIC AND AH) 
ATF = 1 .0, ATF = 0.93, 
Limit 
Kl'P M ission Re uirement VROC = 0  VROC = 500 
X VERTREP 5500max/3,000avg 6581/57 14  lbs · · 48 1 6/3943 lbs 
1 .75 hrs . l .74 hrs 1 . 84 hrs 
X VOD 4,500max/3000avg 208 .6 nm 
I 00 NM 
X Amphibious SAR Up to + 12 PAX 
50 NM 
AIRHEAD 5,500max 0 1 K/90 deg HOGE 
1 2 NM (Performance Limit) 
NEO 12 Pax 12 pax 4K/90 deg HOGE 
I 00 NM 94.2 nm (Performance Limit) 
MEDEVAC 4 Pax : 4 Pax 
I 00 NM 2.:fo NM 
SWS (OW) 8 SEALs 89;3 nm 89.3 nm 
50 NM 
X CSA R (unrefueled) 2 survivors 1 57 NM 60 NM Mid-Mission HOGE (3K I 
200 NM 90F) (Perf. Limit) 
CSAR (refueled) 2 survivors 440 N'M 0 NM Mid-M ission HOGE 
200 NM 
X SWSOL (unfueled) 8 SEALs 1 16 NM 58 NM TOGW & Mid-Mission 
200 NM HOGE (Performance Limit) 
SWSOL (refueled) 8 S EALs 365 NM 226 NM (329 Mid-M ission HOGE 
200 NM w/ 10  min) (Performance Limit) 
X CV PLN GD 5 survivors 2 Aux Tanks req'd. TOGW 
I 00 NM limit. 
M IO 8 SEALs TOGW 
80 NM 










TABLE A-5: AMCM MISSION PROFILE SUMMARY 
Mission Requirement 
AQS-20X Towing 60 Min 
Trop 30 NM 
AQS-20X Towing 30 Min 
Hot 1 0  NM 
OASIS Towing 60 Min 
Trop 30 NM 
OAS IS Towing 30 Min 
Hot 1 0  NM 
1 ALMOS 1 20 Min 
Trap 30 NM 
RAMICS 75 Min 
Trop 30 NM 
AMNS (Tethered) 75 Min 
Trop 30 NM 
AMNS (Untethered) 1 20 Min 
Trop 30 NM 
69 min 
(1 50 lb) 
1 03 min 
1 48 min 1 24 min 
Upwind / Upwind / 
Downwind Downwind 
I Minutes Minutes 
Gross Weight Limit 
Gross Weight Limit 
Gross Weight Limit 
Gross Weight Limit 
1 500 ft HOGE (Perf. 
I Limit) 
( IRP wt-t-perf wt) (Perf. 
Limit) 
Upwind / Downwind 
Minutes ------------------
; V � " " , __ �:� !�\ :1 AQS-20X Towing 
T rop Downwind 
OASIS Towing 
Downwind 
30 up / 30 down 
30 NM 
Trop 30 up / 30 down 
30 NM 
I � ..., '- -, �f,1_. ,-,,_ � 
-
- - - . _:/�'i�; i'  .,.. ,_ l ""' ,.,.--;: t-¢,,_'c' 
I ., i ' � � ,' ' i \/ t,1. 
� 1- ,. '"" .... 
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TABLE A-6: SUMMARY OF MH-60S MISSION PERFORMANCE 
ATF=l .0 ATF=0.93 
VROC=0 VROC=500 
Basic ORD 
7 Total 6/1 4/3 
3 KPP 3/0 2/1 
Armed Helo 
6 Total 3/3 0/6 
3 KPP 1 / 2 0/3 
AMCM 
10 Total 3/7 2/8 
8 KPP 3/5 2/8 
(Source: PMA Brief) 
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Appendix B :  Figures 
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Organic Airborne Mine 
Counfermeasures (OAMCM) 
FIGURE B-1 :  OAMCM SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT 
(Source: PMA Briefing Slide) 
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FIGURE B-2: MH-60S COMPONENTS 
(Source: Ibid) 
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I Block IA - 237 Aircraft 
I Block IB - 201 Aircraft 
I Block 2A - 189 Aircraft 
I Block 2B - 153 Aircraft 
I Block 3A - 152 Aircraft 
I Block 3B - 130 Aircraft 
� IMO/HUMS 
1A Basic Vert Rep, Amphibious SAR 
1 8  1 + Internal Aux Tank Capable 
2A 1B + Console, CSTRS, ASQ-20X, ALMOS, AMNS 
28 2A + TCOL, OASIS, RAMICS 
3A 2B + Side Suppression Weapon, FLIR (MTS), Mission Computer, Second Aux Ta nk 
3A + Precision guided Munition, Forward Firing Weapon, Llnk-16, Integrated Self 
38 Defense, Dlgltal Moving Map, Helmet Mounted Dlsplay, Improved FLIR Mount 









Combat Support: IOC FY02 
• Replaces the Aging H-46D, 
HH-60H HH-lN, and H-3 with a 
Newly Manufactured H-60 Airframe 
• Supports Helo CONOPS Throu9h 
Reduction of Type/Model/Senes 
from 7 to 3 
• New Production of 237 A/ C 
• 5000 + LBS Internal/External cargo 
• Fully Integrated Glass Cockpit and 
Mission Sensor Suite 
• Cockpit Common with MH-60R 
BLOCK 2A: IOC CY 05 
• Carriage, Stream, Tow and 
Recovery System (CSTRS) 
• Common Console 
• Auxiliary Fuel Tank 
• AN/AQS-20A Sonar Mine 
Detection Set1 
• AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine 
Detection System (ALMDS)1 
BLOCK 28: IOC FY07 
• Sensor Link 
• Airborne Mine Neutralization 
System (AMNS)1 
• Organic Airborne & Surface 
Influence Sweep (OASIS)1 
• Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance 
System (RAMICS)1 
1 PMS-210 Development Items 
BLOCK 3A: IOC FY06 
• Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR) 
• Crew Served Guns 
• Additional Aux Tank 
• Mission Computer 
• External Weapons Mount System 
• Integrated Self Defense ((SD) System 
• Precision Guided Munition Air to Ground 
• Fuel Probe 
BLOCK 38: IOC FY07 
• Link 16 
BLOCK JC: (Planned; IOC TBD) 
• Digital Moving Map 
• Helmet Mounted Display 
• Improved FLIR Mount 
• Forward Firing Weapon 
FIGURE B-4: MH-60S SPIRAL ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
(Source: Ibid) 
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Commander Steven E. Halpern was born in Queens, New York on 13 May 1965. 
In July 1983, he entered the United States Naval Academy and graduated in May 1987 
with a B.S. in General Engineering. Upon graduation, he was commissioned an Ensign 
in the United States Navy and reported to Pensacola, Florida for flight training. In May 
1989, he earned his "wings" and began follow-on flight training in the SH-3 Sea King 
helicopter. Commander Halpern's first assignment was at NAS Patuxent River, MD as a 
Search and Rescue pilot. Following his first assignment, he was selected for transition 
training to the MH-53E "Sea Dragon" in Norfolk Virginia. In 1991, Commander 
Halpern reported to HM-14 where he made numerous detachments in support of the 
Airborne Mine Countermeasures mission. In 1995, Commander Halpern was selected for 
Naval Test Pilot School (USNTPS). Following graduation from USNTPS, Commander 
Halpern reported to the Naval Rotary Wing Aircraft Test Squadron as the MH-53E 
platform coordinator and Dynamic Interface Department Head. In this capacity, he was 
in charge of several H-53E dynamic interface detachments and was a project officer for 
both Navy and USMC test programs. In 1999, Commander Halpern reported to HM-15 
in Corpus Christi, Texas for his Department Head tour. While at HM-15, Commander 
Halpern held the billets of Admin Officer and then Maintenance Officer as well as 
detachment Officer in Charge. In recognition of superior performance while assigned as 
HM-15 Maintenance Officer, Commander Halpern was recognized as the NHA 
Maintenance Officer of the Year 2002. 
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In November 2001, Commander Halpern reported to Naval Air Systems Command and 
held the Aviation Training Lead and his current assignment, Mission Systems IPT Lead 
on the MH-60S program. 
Commander Halpern has completed Joint Professional Military Education at Air 
Command and Staff, Air University and is a graduate of the Advanced Program 
Management Course, Defense Systems Management College, Defense Acquisition 
University. 
Commander Halpern has been selected for aviation command and will report to 
Norfolk, Virginia in May 2003. In the Fall 2003, Commander Halpern will become the 
Commanding Officer, Airborne Mine Countermeasures Weapons Systems Training 
School. 
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